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Comment
Assignment and Negotiation: A Violation
of Due Process
INTRODUCTION
An installment contract is an agreement between a buyer and a
seller, whereby, for consideration received, the buyer agrees to pay a
certain specified amount to the seller in periodic installments until the
total contract price is paid. This type of contract may arise in an infi-
nite variety of situations, ranging from loan agreements and retail
purchases to club memberships. Generally these contracts are drafted
by the seller and the language contained is usually incomprehensible
to the average consumer. As a result, the consumer often finds that he
has waived rights to which he would otherwise be entitled. Simply
stated, the problem is that most consumers do not know what they are
signing.
Realizing this problem, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently held Pennsylvania's confes-
sion of judgment practice unconstitutional.' The decision was based
on the theory that there was not a knowing waiver of constitutional
rights by the debtor-petitioners. The purpose of this comment is to
demonstrate that the rationale of this case also applies to negotiable
instruments and assignable contracts in which consumers may likewise
unknowingly waive their constitutional rights.
In order to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of current contract
practices, confessions of judgment must first be examined. Discussion
will center around their history and practices and why they have been
held unconstitutional. 2 Using this as the basis for later discussion, the
history and practices of negotiable contracts will be explored and their
possible unconstitutionality will be demonstrated.





Installment contracts and negotiable instruments appear to be very
similar to confessions of judgment, both in their practices and in their
problems. Since the questionable constitutionality arising from the
transfer of negotiable instruments and assignment of installment con-
tracts will later be discussed, it is important to first understand con-
fessions of judgment and why they have been held unconstitutional.
Confessions of Judgment-Practices and Problems
The confession of judgment, variously known as a cognovit note or
a judgment note, traces its origin to the common law.3 Blackstone states
that:
[I]n order to strengthen a creditor's security, [a] debtor [may] exe-
cute a warrant of attorney to some attorney named by the creditor,
empowering him to confess a judgment . . . in an action of debt
to be brought by the creditor against the debtor for the specific
sum due: which judgment, when confessed, is absolutely com-
plete and binding; . .. .4
A warrant of attorney to confess judgment apparently creates in
the creditor an "agency coupled with an interest." This being so, it
is not an agency at all since the creditor is acting upon a security in-
terest which he holds in his own right.5 The Restatement of Agency 2d
properly views it as a "power given as security" and defines this power
as:
[A] power to affect the legal relations of another, created in the
form of an agency authority, but held for the benefit of the power
holder or a third person and given to secure the performance of
a duty or to protect a title, either legal or equitable, such power
being given when the duty or title is created or given for con-
sideration.6
After conveying a security interest to the creditor, the debtor cannot
revoke the creditor's power of attorney to confess judgment-to do so
would allow the debtor to deny the creditor his contract rights. Only
3. Consumers Mining Co. v. Chatak, 92 Pa. Super. 17 (1927) stated that the right
to confess judgment was a right at common law and the confession statutes only apply to
procedure.
4. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *397.
5. See Mellon v. Ritz, 332 Pa. 97, 2 A.2d 699 (1938).
6. rESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 138 (1957).
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satisfaction of the debt, destruction of the subject matter, or conveyance
to a bona fide purchaser 7 will terminate this power.
Confessions of judgment in America may be classified into three
different categories: void, limited, and allowed. Twenty jurisdictions
declare confessions of judgment void.8 Of these jurisdictions, three
declare such use a crime. 9 Seventeen allow them only under certain
limited circumstances.10 Three have completely repealed their con-
fessions of judgment statutes"1 and of the ten remaining jurisdictions
allowing confessions, 12 they are widely used in only Illinois, Ohio and
Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania's statute provides that the clerk of courts, upon appli-
cation of the holder of a confession of judgment, confess judgment
against the defendant for the face amount of the instrument.'l Essen-
7. Id. § 139. Pennsylvania also allows the death of the debtor to terminate the power,
Stucker v. Shumaker, 290 Pa. 348, 139 A. 114 (1927); Lanning v. Pawson, 38 Pa. 480 (1860).
In this respect a warrant of attorney to confess judgment does not fulfiill the require-
ments of an "agency coupled with an interest" since death of the debtor will affect the
creditor's rights.
8. ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 16 (1958); CAL. COMM. CODE § 1804.1 (West 1964); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-16-6 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 42-88 (1958); FLA. STAT. § 55.05 (1969);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2904 (1968); LA. R. S. 6:585 (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83,
§130b (1957); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch 255B, § 20 (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. § 56.12 (1969);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 13-811 (1947); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 361-A:7VIII-I (1966); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-37 (1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-9-16 (1953); N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW
§ 403(3)(c) (McKinney 1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-13-02 (13) (1960); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 83.670(1) (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-800.13 (1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 25-201 (1955); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2224 (Vernon 1964).
9. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2906 (1968); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 21-9-18 (1953); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 83.990(1) (1969).
10. ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.050 (1962); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. 22-219 (1956); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 29-301 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 110-601 (1935); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 633-3 (1968);
IDAHO CODE § 10-901,904 (1948); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.090 (Baldwin's 1969); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27A.2906 (1962); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1551 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 511.070-.080
(Vernon 1949); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-907 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 689 (1961);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 19-25-24 (1968); S.D. CODE § 37:0301 (Supp. 1960); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 2139 (1958); VA. CODE § 8-355 (Supp. 1971); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.60.010-.070
(1956). These limited circumstances may vary from state to state. Some limitations are:
monetary limitation of amount confessed, allowing confession in only certain types of
contracts, requiring that the defendant personally appear before the Clerk of Courts in
order to confess judgment, requiring that confessions of judgments are only valid if
made under oath, or restricting their use in only cases of default.
11. IOWA CODE § 676.1 (Supp. 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-247, 1-249 (1969); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-205(2) (1966).
12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2306 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 50 (3) (Smith-Hurd
1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3084 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 17-090 (1957); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§2323.12, .13 (Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1971);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-3 (1953); W. VA. CODE § 56-4-48 (1966); Wis. STAT. § 270.69 (1969);
WyO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-309-312 (1957).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1971):
It shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any court of record, within this Common-
wealth, on the application of any person being the original holder (or assignee of
such holder) of a note, bond, or other instrument of writing, in which judgment is
confessed, or containing a warrant for an attorney at law, or other person to confess
judgment, to enter judgment against the person or persons, who executed the same
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tially a warrant of attorney to confess judgment authorizes the creditor
to appear on behalf of the debtor and have the clerk of courts enter
judgment against the debtor. 14 In addition to authorizing a confession
of judgment, a debtor may also waive personal allowances which are
exempt from execution, 15 procedural defects, 6 and the right to appeal
from such procedural defects.' 7
When a consumer purchases an item under a retail installment con-
tract, he agrees to pay a certain portion of the principal plus interest
for a stipulated period of time. This is often all the consumer knows.
Even if the consumer were to read the contract, it is highly doubtful he
would understand its legal phraseology. In Swarb v. Lennox, after
reading a confession of judgment clause which she had previously
signed, a witness testified that she could not understand, nor could
she explain, its meaning.'8 Should the consumer question the meaning
of such a clause, he is simply told it is a "judgment note,"'19 and if he
for the amount, which, from the face of the instrument, may appear to be due,
without the agency of an attorney, or declaration filed, with such stay of execution
as may be therein mentioned, for the fee of one dollar, to be paid by the defendant;
particularly entering on his docket the date and tenor of the instrument of writing,
on which the judgment may be founded, which shall have the same force and effect,
as if a declaration had been filed, and judgment confessed by an attorney, or judg-
ment obtained in open court, and in term time; and the defendant shall not be com-
pelled to pay any costs, or fee to the plaintiff's attorney, when judgment is entered
on any instrument of writing as aforesaid.
14. A confession of judgment clause, appearing in note 14 of Swarb v. Lennox, 314
F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1970) provided that:
Each buyer and co-buyer, jointly and severally, hereby authorize and empower the
Prothonotary, Clerk or any attorney, of any court of record within the United States
or elsewhere, at any time, to appear for each buyer and co-buyer and to confess
judgment as often as necessary against each buyer and of co-buyer and in favor of the
holder, as of any term, with or without declaration filed for such sum or sums as may
be payable hereunder with the cost of suit with 20 per cent added as attorney's fees.
With respect to any judgment and exemption under any law now or hereafter in force
[sic*], and each hereby agrees that real estate may be sold under a writ or execution
and voluntarily condemns the same and authorize the Prothonotary or Clerk to enter
said condcmnation of such writ; and each buyer and co-buyer agrees that a true copy
hereof, verified by affidavit made by the holder or someone acting on its behalf, may
be filed in such proceeding in lieu of filing the original as warrant of attorney, any
rule of court, custom to practice to the contrary notwithstanding. Any judgment en-
tered hereon or of any prior note for which the note is in whole or in part mediately
or immediately renewal shall be secured, security for the payment hereof and of any
future note which is in whole or in part mediately or immediately renewal hereof.
* It would appear that a clause was left out where the buyer waived any exemption laws.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2161 (1967) created a $300 exemption from execution,
however, Bowyer's Appeal, 21 Pa. 210 (1853) held that the judgment-debtor must elect to
take advantage of the statute and it could be waived.
16. Hazlewood Savings & Trust Co. v. Zahniser, 78 Prrr. L.J. 332 (Pa. C. P. 1929).
17. Consumers Mining Co. v. Chatak, 92 Pa. Super. 17 (1927).
18. 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See the testimony of Mrs. Doris Mims
who read and signed the confession of judgment clause appearing in note 14.
19. Id. See the testimony of Mr. Casnoff, an officer in a consumer finance company.
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were to ask for an explanation, he would be told that this clause of the
contract allows the creditor to sue the debtor if the debtor were to
default in his monthly payments. It becomes obvious the consumer
never knows the true ramifications of such a clause.20
By signing a contract containing such a clause, the debtor authorizes
an attorney, chosen by the creditor, to enter an appearance before the
court on behalf of the debtor, thereby giving the court personal juris-
diction. The confession statute does not require that the defendant-
debtor receive notice2' and would seem to be invalid under the
rationale of Wuchter v. Pizzutti,22 where the Supreme Court held that a
non-resident motorists long-arm statute was unconstitutional unless
it contained a provision reasonably calculated to give actual notice to
the defendant. This situation is easily circumvented by the defendant-
debtor's express consent (versus implied consent as in Wuchter) to the
jurisdiction of the court.23 Some confession clauses even contain, as
additional protection, an express waiver of notice. Such practice does
not violate due process, as the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,24 "[a]nd
it is settled. . . that parties to a contract may agree in advance to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served
by the opposing party, or even waive notice altogether. '25
Having impliedly waived notice by authorizing a warrant of attorney,
the defendant-debtor never has the opportunity to defend, though a
valid defense may be available. Even where the debtor does not de-
fault, confession may be entered against him at any time under Penn-
sylvania's confession statute,26 with enforcement of the judgment being
held in abeyance until default.27 Such practice is not followed if the
creditor wants the no,. to be negotiable, since a "confession at any
20. Id. See the testimony of Thomas Veney, a detective with the Consumers Fraud
Division of the Philadelphia County District Attorney's Office, who noted that after
debtors learned the meaning of confessions of judgment clauses in contracts which they
had signed, they expressed both shock and disbelief at the existence of such a clause and
its legal meaning.
21. See confession of judgment statute, note 13; also O'Hara v. Manley, 140 Pa. Super.
39, 12 A.2d 820 (1940).
22. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
23. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws, Part one: Jurisdiction and Judgments, § 27 at 89
(1962); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 73 at 121 (4th ed. 1964); LEFLAR, AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW, § 26 at 46 (Stu. ed. 1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 81 (1957).
24. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
25. Id. at 315.
26. See confession of judgment statute, note 13; also Harwood v. Bruhn, 313 Pa. 337,
170 A. 144 (1934).
27. Shapiro v. Malarkay, 278 Pa. 78, 122 A. 341 (1923).
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time note" is rendered nonnegotiable under Uniform Commercial
Code § 3-112.28 Though a defendant-debtor may be defenseless against
the initial judgment, he may still avail himself of two remedies: a
motion to strike and a petition to open the judgment. 29 A judgment
can be stricken only if some irregularity appears upon the face of the
record. 0 If no irregularities appear, the debtor's only recourse is to
petition to open the judgment. A petition to open is an appeal in
equity and in its discretion the court may open the judgment in order
to allow a meritorious defense.31 The debtor must proceed on depo-
sitions,32 because these are the only bases for the court to make a
factual determination as to whether the defense can be established at
trial.33 These two remedies presuppose that the defendant-debtor has
sufficient time to move or petition the court 34 and has sufficient funds
28. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 version) § 3-112. Terms and Omissions Not
Affecting Negotiability.
(1) The negotiability of an instrument is not affected by
(d) a term authorizing a confession of judgment on the instrument if it is not
paid when due;
(2) Nothing in this section shall validate any term which is otherwise illegal.
Id. Comment 2.
As under the original Section 5(2), paragraph (d) is intended to mean that a con-
fession of judgment may be authorized only if the instrument is not paid when due,
and that otherwise negotiability is affected. The use of judgment notes is confined
to two or three states, and in others the judgment clauses are illegal and ineffective
either by special statutes or by decision. Subsection (2) is intended to say that any
such local rule remains unchanged, and that the clause itself may be invalid although
the negotiability of the instrument is not affected.
29. Miller v. Michael Morris, Inc., 361 Pa. 113, 63 A.2d 44 (1949) holding that these
two remedies are not exclusive of one another or res judicata.
30. Id.
31. Girard Trust Bank v. Remick, 215 Pa. Super. 375, 258 A.2d 882 (1969).
32. Kine v. Forman, 404 Pa. 301, 172 A.2d 164 (1961).
33. Girard Trust Bank v. Remick, 215 Pa. Super. 375, 258 A.2d 882 (1969), which
held sufficient facts must be pleaded to show the defense is meritorious and the defense
can only be established at trial.
34. PA. R. Civ. P. 2958. Execution. Notice of Entry of Judgment
(a) Within twenty (20) days after the entry of judgment the plaintiff shall mail to
the defendant, by ordinary mail addressed to the defendant at his last known address,
written notice of the entry setting forth the date, the court, term and number and
the amount of the judgment, and file with the prothonotary an affidavit of mailing
of the notice. Failure to mail the notice and file the affidavit shall not affect the lien
of the judgment.
(b) Within twenty (20) days after the entry of judgment the plaintiff may issue a writ
of execution even if the notice has not yet been mailed and the affidavit of mailing
has not yet been filed. The lien of any levy or attachment made pursuant to such
a writ within or after the twenty (20) day period shall be valid. However, no further
proceedings may be had pursuant to such writ until twenty (20) days after the notice
has been mailed and the affidavit of mailing has been filed. (Italics added).
The court in Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970) after discussing this
twenty day provision, summarily dismissed it as not affording the defendant-debtors
enough time to obtain counsel and prepare a motion to strike off or a petition to open the
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to pay an attorney,35 in addition to paying for the costs of depositions
and Sheriff's costs incurred in staying execution. Often these additional
expenses to the defendant-debtor preclude any such action.36 The
burden in these proceedings is placed upon the debtor and "is in
direct contrast to the burdens in a normal or pre-judgment creditor-
debtor action. In those cases instituted by a creditor against a debtor,
the creditor is considered the proponent of a claim and the burdens
are his." 37
The vast majority of judgment debtors earn marginal incomes.38 The
companies employing such clauses in their contracts justify their use
as "convenience."8 9 The creditor does not incur attorneys' fees or exe-
cution costs since the confession clause adds these costs into the total
judgment.40 Judgment need not wait in congested courts but is im-
mediate. The companies argue that the vast majority of defaulting
debtors have no valid defenses against collection, and were it not for the
easy collection procedures offered by the use of confessions of judgment,
consumer transactions with marginal income consumers would not be
feasible. 41 Since the default rate of these consumers is so high, the
selling institutions would incur such high collection costs that trans-
actions with these high-risk consumers would be virtually impossible.
Consequently, the selling institutions argue, it is the marginal income
consumer who benefits from confessions of judgment. These argu-
ments ignore how the selling institutions conduct business with
marginal income consumers in jurisdictions which have no confessions
of judgment. In those jurisdictions the debtor signs a default clause
judgment. It is interesting to note that under PA. R. Civ. P. 1026, a defendant is only
given twenty days after service of the complaint in which to locate an attorney and to
draw up an answer-something which the Swarb court failed to discuss at all.
35. For the filing of a petition to open, the Philadelphia Bar Association Minimum
Fee Schedule suggests attorneys' fees of $150 and the Allegheney County Bar (Pittsburgh)
Minimum Fee Bill suggests attorneys' fees of $100 for drawing up a petition or motion and
presenting it to the court.
36. A study by David Caplovitz, Ph. D., entitled Consumers in Trouble (1968), cited in
Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1970), showed that of 245 judgment
debtors in Philadelphia which were studied: 56 per cent had incomes below $6,000,
18 per cent less than $3,000, 12 per cent $8,000--$10,000, and 4 per cent exceeding $10,000.
These are what is termed low income or marginal income consumers and as can be seen
do not have much of a capital outlay.
37. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
38. See Caplovitz, Consumers in Trouble, note 36.
39. Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit, 29 U. Ci. L. REv. 111 (1961) in which the author undertook a comprehensive
survey of the use of confessions of judgment by sending out questionnaires to numerous
financial institutions.
40. See confession of judgment, note 14.
41. See Hopson, supra note 39.
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providing for reasonable attorneys' fees and collection costs. Upon de-
fault the creditor files the complaint, and since the defaulting debtor
usually has no defenses, he fails to enter an appearance even though
served with notice. The creditor then obtains a default judgment and
executes. An additional advantage is that this procedure of using de-
fault judgments avoids the difficulties which are often encountered in
enforcing confessed judgments in foreign jurisdictions. 42
Violation of Due Process-Swarb v. Lennox
The problem is simply that most consumers do not know nor do they
understand what they are signing. 43 Some suggested remedies have
ranged from declaring such contracts unconscionable, 44 to finding such
procedure violative of the debtor's constitutional right to due process-
failure to provide for notice,45 to abolishing confessions of judgment
because of their harshness and providing for garnishment procedures. 46
Recently in a class action, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Swarb v. Lennox47 took a new
approach. Though restricting its holding to judgment notes in leases
and consumer financing transations for individuals having incomes less
than $10,000, which in itself may be a violation of equal protection,48
the court found that the Pennsylvania confession practice violates due
process. Relying upon Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Comm'n.49 and Brookhart
v. Janis5° the court quoted Brookhart:
There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights,
(citing cases) and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly
42. Id. See Atlas Credit Corp. v. Erzine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382, 250 N.E.2d
474 (1969) which held that Pennsylvania's confession of judgment procedure was not a
"judicial proceeding" within the meaning of the full faith and credit clause of the U.S.
Constitution. See also 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 367 (1970) for a critical analysis of the Erzine
court's holding.
43. See footnotes 17, 18, and 19.
44. Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 TEMPLE L.Q. 125 (1962);
Comment, Abolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in Retail Installment Sales
Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 DicK. L. REv. 115 (1968).
45. See Hopson, supra note 39; and Comment, supra note 44. The distinction should
be drawn here in that these commentators felt that a defendant should always receive
notice, whereas the Swarb case dealt with an unknowing waiver of the right to notice.
46. Comment, Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. OF PA. L. REv. 524 (1954).
47. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
48. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1112 (E.D. Pa. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S.
991 (1971), in which a motion to expand relief, from the first Swarb case, 314 F. Supp.
1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), to include consumers earning more than $10,000 was refused. See
also 75 DiCK. L. REv. 169 (1970) for a criticism of the Swarb case's $10,000 limitation
based upon equal protection.
49. 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
50. 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
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established that there was "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." (Citing cases).
In deciding the federal question of waiver raised here we must,
of course, look to the facts which allegedly support the waiver. 51
The court concluded after examining the facts that the debtor-peti-
tioners did not understand or know that by signing confession clauses
they were waiving their right to notice prior to judgment.52 This right,
being essential to the due process requirement of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, must be knowingly waived.
Though restricting its holding to the unknowing waiver of the due
process notice requirement, the court recognized the real problem-
most consumers do not know, nor can they understand, what they are
signing.5
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS
Negotiable instruments when transferred and installment contracts
when assigned may give rise to the same constitutional argument which
was raised against confessions of judgment. For the purposes of this
comment, it is not necessary to distinguish between negotiable con-
tracts and those which are nonnegotiable but can be assigned. As will
become apparent, the same basic principles will apply with one excep-
tion and so the material which immediately follows is intended to
serve only as a basis for an examination of the constitutionality of such
contracts.
Negotiable Instruments and Installment Contracts-
Practices and Problems
In order to qualify as a negotiable instrument, the contract must
meet the requirements of § 3-104(1) of the Commercial Paper Article
of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to as the
U.C.C.) which has been adopted by all the states, except Louisiana.
§ 3-104 provides:
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article
must
51. 314 F. Supp. at 1100 citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
52. See notes 18 and 19 for parts of the relevant testimony.
53. See page 106 infra, for a more detailed discussion.
100
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(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation
or power or given by the maker or drawer except as author-
ized by this Article; and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.54 (Emphasis added.)
The words "payable to order or assigns of"55 or "payable to bearer"56
may be the only indication in the contract that it is negotiable. Even
appearance of the words "Negotiable Instrument" on the face of the
contract in bold type does not inform the consumer of the importance
of negotiation. The retailer may negotiate the note to a finance com-
pany, who may qualify as a holder in due course under U.C.C.
§ 3-302(1).
A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or
of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
By authorizing the negotiation, the consumer, in effect, waives some
of his defenses, if the transferee qualifies as a holder in due course.
Section 3-305 of the U.C.C. states that:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes
the instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the
holder has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract;
and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the trans-
action, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
54. UNIFOR COMMERCML CODE (1962 version), § 3-104(1).
55. Section 3-110 of the U.C.C. defines "payable to order" as:
(1) An instrument is payable to order when by its terms it is payable to the order
or assigns of any person therein specified with reasonable certainty, or to him or
his order, or when it is conspicuously designated on its face as "exchange" or the
like and names a payee.
56. § 3111 of the U.C.C. defines "payable to bearer" as:
An instrument is payable to bearer when by its terms it is payable to
(a) bearer or the order of bearer; or
(b) a specified person or bearer; or
(c) "cash" or the order of "cash," or any other indication which does not purport
to designate a specific payee.
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(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable oppor-
tunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential
terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceeding; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when
he takes the instrument.
This doctrine of a holder in due course taking an instrument free
of certain defenses of the debtor was first recognized at common law57
and later in the Negotiable Instruments Law.58 The distinction is
made in types of defenses. Incapacity to contract, duress, fraud in the
execution, and insolvency proceedings are considered "real" defenses
and are valid against a holder in due course under U.C.C. § 3-305.
Failure of consideration, breach of warranty, non-performance of a
condition precedent, fraud in the inducement, and theft of the instru-Men are c oidered "personal" defenses and under U.C.C. § 3-30619
are valid against anyone except holders in due course. The problem
moves from the academic to reality when the consumer purchases a
consumer item with a ninety day warranty against defects in parts or
workmanship. In so purchasing, he signs a note promising to pay in
installments which qualifies as a negotiable instrument. The retailer
immediately discounts the instrument to a finance company. A few
days after the purchase, the product breaks down, and the retailer re-
fuses to repair it. The consumer then refuses to make additional in-
stallments on the promissory note until the retailer complies with the
guarantee. Normally, the personal defense of breach of warranty would
57. Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824).
58. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 57 (act withdrawn 1952). Rights of a Holder in
Due Course. A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title
of prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and
may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties
liable thereon.
59. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 version), § 3-306. Rights of One Not a Holder
in Due Course:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the instrument
subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an action on a simple
contract; and
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-performance of any condi-
tion precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special purpose (Section 3-408); and
(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the instrument ac-
quired it by theft, or that payment or satisfaction to such holder would be in-
consistent with the terms of a restrictive indorsement. The claim of any third person
to the instrument is not otherwise available as a defense to any party liable theron
unless the third person himself defends the action for such party.
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be a valid defense to a suit brought by the retailer. Since the note has
been negotiated, however, this defense is no longer available to the
consumer in a suit for collection brought by the finance company.
The finance company qualifies as a holder in due course under U.C.C.
§ 3-302 in that it took the note in good faith, without notice of any
defense and paid value for it. As a result, the consumer must pay the
finance company, even though having a valid defense against the re-
tailer.
The concept of "holder in due course" applies only to instruments
which are negotiable. If the "promise to pay" contained in the contract
is conditional, the contract is nonnegotiable.60 This fact however, does
not prevent the creditor from obtaining the effect of a negotiable in-
strument. The contract simply contains a clause stating that the con-
sumer agrees not to assert any defenses, which he may have against the
seller, against the assignee of the contract. Such agreements are valid
and the assignee takes the contract free of any "personal" defenses,
"real" defenses still being valid against the assignee.6' Thus, by virtue
of such a clause, the assignee has, in effect, the same rights as a holder in
due course. In the above fact situation, if the consumer had signed a
nonnegotiable contract which contained such a clause, the same result
would have prevailed. The consumer must pay the finance company,
the assignee of the contract, even though having a valid defense against
the retailer.62
60. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 version) § 3-104(l)(b). For purposes of this com-
ment, it is not necessary to distinguish between those promises which are conditional,
and those promises which are not. The U.C.C. has largely left to each individual juris-
diction that determination. As a result jurisdictions vary as to what constitutes an
unconditional promise to pay. In Webb and Sons, Inc. v. Hamilton, 30 App. Div. 2d 597,
290 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1968) it was held that an agreement to pay within sixty days "from
jobs now under construction" did not constitute an unconditional promise to pay. An
even narrower approach was taken in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Deweese, 1 U.C.C.
Rept. 204 (M.D. Tenn. 1963) where it was held §§ 3-201, 3-202, 3-401 are not applicable
to conditional sales contracts since § 3-104(2) expressly states that only drafts, checks,
certificates of deposit and notes are negotiable instruments.
61. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 version) § 9-206(1). Agreement Not to Assert
Defenses Against Assignee; Modification of Sales Warranties Where Security Agreement
Exists.
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers
or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or
lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith
and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may
be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under the
Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of one transaction
signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such an agreement.
62. As can be seen, the concepts of holder in due course and assignee taking free of
defenses are nearly identical, and hereinafter no effort will be made to distinguish them.
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This does not leave the consumer remediless. He can always bring
an action against the retailer under U.C.C. § 2-71463 for breach of
warranty, but in reality this is usually impractical. Thirty to forty
per cent of any damages awarded will go to attorney's fees. In addi-
tion, the consumer will be compelled to pay some of the costs in-
cident to litigation. As a result, the net damages awarded to the
consumer do not cover his actual loss, an the inner satisfaction of
winning a case is small recompense compared to the time and trouble
experienced. Unless the stakes are high, either financially or in prin-
ciple, few consumers will avail themselves of any remedies they may
have against the retailer.
Courts and commentators have long recognized the problems pre-
sented by allowing holders in due course and assignees of contracts
containing a waiver of defense clause a protected status against per-
sonal defenses and the harsh results upon the consumer. It has only
been recently that in certain situations this protected status has been
stripped away. One approach suggests that such installment contracts
are by their very nature "adhesive," and courts should declare them
unconscionable and deny enforcement under the broad language of
U.C.C. § 2-302.64 Even before the adoption of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, courts begin to recognize what has been termed the "close
connectedness" doctrine-the possible existence of a close relationship
between the seller and the finance company. In Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works,65 where the plaintiff finance
company advanced money to the seller to finance the transaction and
otherwise advised the seller, the California Supreme Court decided
that:
When a finance company actively participates in a transaction of
this type from its inception, counseling and aiding the future
vendor-payee, it cannot be regarded as a holder in due course of
63. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 version) § 2-714(1). Buyer's Damages for Breach
in Regard to Accepted Goods.
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) of Sec-
tion 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in
any manner which is reasonable.
64. Shuchman, supra note 44. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 version) § 2-302(1).
Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the Court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscion-
able clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result.
65. 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
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the note given in the transaction and the defense of failure of
consideration may properly be maintained.66
In Unico v. Owen,67 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a
partnership formed for the purpose of financing a seller of consumer
goods, which exercised extensive control over the seller's entire business
operations, could not avail itself of the protected status of a holder in
due course with respect to notes assigned to the partnership by the
seller. Aside from the cases representing the "close connectedness"
doctrine, there is authority that the test should be the finance company's
lack of good faith. 68
These approaches afford some relief to the consumer, but all deal
either with the finance company-seller relationship or look purely at
the finance company's conduct. None of these approaches look to the
consumer and his defenses. Some recent legislation has taken a differ-
ent approach and requires that the assignee of a retail installment
contract notify the consumer of the assignment and allow the con-
sumer a specified period of time in which to assert any defense, real or
personal, against the enforcement of the contract.6 9 If the assignee is
notified of the defense, he has actual notice and cannot qualify as a
holder in due course under U.C.C. § 3-302 (1) (c),70 or as an assignee
taking free of "personal" defenses under U.C.C. § 9-206 (1).71 Such
statutes may remedy some of the consumers' problems, but they are
not the solution. Of what avail is a statute which allows the consumer
to assert personal defenses against an assignee for a period of forty-five
days after assignment; when the note is assigned by the seller the day
following the sale, and the product sold, having a ninety day guarantee,
proves defective sixty days after purchase? By extending the length of
time beyond the period of the warranty, the assignee may never acquire
the protected status to which he is entitled.
66. Id. at 771, 214 P.2d at 822.
67. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
68. Davis v. Commerdal Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950). See
Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test,
39 S. CAL. L. REV. 48 (1966). These authorities suggest that rather than look for bad faith
in each case, as the "close connectedness" cases did, the better approach is to look to the
holder's relationship with all sellers, not just the one in question and also to look to
all the holder's transactions and not just the one in question.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1402 (Supp. 1971) which allows a consumer 45 days after
notice of assignment of a retail installment contract to assert personal defenses against the
assignee. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-208 (Supp. 1971) which allows the consumer
15 days for home improvement installment contracts.
70. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 version) § 3-302(l)(c) at page 101; Comment,
The Pennsylvania Goods and Services Installment Sales Act, 12 VILL. L. REv. 643 (1967).
71. See note 6.
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Indeed, there is nothing wrong with the protection afforded holders
in due course or assignees of contracts containing waiver of defense
clauses, so long as the consumer realizes that his personal defenses will
be cut off by the transfer or assignment and agrees to it. It becomes ob-
vious that such statutes cannot strike a balance between protecting
transferees or assignees and the personal defenses of consumers with-
out destroying one or the other.7 2 It would seem that legislation along
this line is not the solution-the problem still remains.
A Violation of Due Process
The problem, as presented in the commercial setting is that most
consumers do not know what they are authorizing. Well over ninety
per cent of consumer contracts are standard form agreements, uni-
laterally drafted, which have been generally described as "adhesive. ' '7
No adequate explanatinn of the contract's terms or ramifications is
made to the consumer. 74 Invariably sellers refuse to allow unsigned
contracts to be removed from the business premises which, in turn,
would enable the consumer to obtain knowledge of the contract's
terms. In some cases the seller may even refuse to allow the consumer to
inspect the contract before it is signed.75 Obviously an attorney cannot
offer good advice without first seeing the contract. It becomes apparent
that the consumer cannot avail himself of an attorney's advice without
the contract, even if he could afford to visit an attorney every time he
signed an installment contract. In simple terms, most consumers do not
understand nor can they be expected to understand what they are
signing. The Swarb case recognized the problem and dealt with it on a
constitutional level-that the confession-debtors did not knowingly
waive their constitutional rights of due process. The same argument
made in Swarb can be made for the protection of the consumer who
unknowingly authorizes the transfer of his note or assignment of his
contract containing a clause waiving defenses.
72. An example of a statute where the protected status has been destroyed altogether
is PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615 G. (1965 )which states:
No installment sale contract shall require or entail the execution of any note or series
of notes by the buyer, which when separately negotiated, will cut off as to third
parties any right of action or defense which the buyer may have against the original
seller.
73. See Shuchman, supra note 44, at page 128.
74. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), see the testimony of Thomas
veney, supra note 20.
75. See Shuchman, supra note 44 citing insurance policies as the most flagrant example,
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The similarities between confessions of judgment and installment
contracts are striking. In the former, the debtors did not know what
they were authorizing. They may have had valid defenses against actions
brought by the creditors, but the unilateral act of the creditors (con-
fessing judgment) rendered the defenses worthless.76 In the assigned
installment contract situation, again consumers do not know what they
are authorizing. They may have a valid defense against actions brought
by the seller-creditors, but the unilateral act of the seller-creditor
(transfer or assignment) renders any personal defenses worthless as to
a suit brought by the transferee or assignee.
It should be noted at this juncture that the Swarb case restricted its
holding to the unknowing waiver of notice, but the court also found:
[T]here was no intentional waiver of a known right by the members
of the above class in executing the confession of judgment clauses.
The evidence indicates that the debtors did not fully understand
the rights which they were relinquishing by signing these notes,
that is, the right to have notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to judgment, the right to have the burden of proving default
rest upon the creditor before their property could possibly be ex-
posed to execution, and, finally, the right to avoid the additional
expense of attorney's fees and costs incident to opening or striking
off a confessed judgment under the above-described Pennsylvania
procedure. 77 (Emphasis added).
This language bears close scrutiny, for as can be seen, the court
talks broadly in terms of due process rights. Due process rights may be
categorized as either procedural or substantive. Notice and opportunity
to be heard are procedural due process rights as recognized in Powell
v. State of Alabama5 where the United States Supreme Court stated:
It never has been doubted by this court, or any other so far as we
know, that notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to
the passing of an enforceable judgment, and that they, together
with a legally competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case,
constitute basic elements of the constitutional requirement of due
process of law. [T]he necessity of due process and an opportunity
where the insured does not receive the policy (contract) until after he has paid his
premium.
76. See note 34, regarding the Swarb court's weak discussion of the judgment-debtors'
defenses. It should be noted here that his weakness in Swarb in no way weakens the
rationale for extending Swarb to negotiable contracts where, once the contract is assigned,
the debtor has no personal defenses to raise by means of a petition to open as in the
confessed judgment situation.
77. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
78. Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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to be heard is described as among the "immutable principles of
justice which no member of the Union my disregard." 79
The Swarb court apparently recognized the "right to have the bur-
den of proving default" and the "right to avoid additional expenses" to
be substantive due process rights, 0 but restricted its holding specifically
to the unknowing waiver of notice. Perhaps the strongest Supreme
Court support for the Swarb holding can be found in National Equip-
ment Rental v. Szukhent.s1 That case involved a Michigan farmer who
leased two incubators from the plaintiff-petitioners in New York. The
contract designated the wife of one of the corporate lessor's officers as
the lessee's agent for the purpose of accepting service of process. In a
5-4 decision, the majority, through Justice Stewart, stated: "We need
not and do not in this case reach the situation where no personal
notice has been given to the defendant. Since the respondents did in
fact receive complete and timely notice of the lawsuit pending against
them, no due process claims has been made. '82 In a strong dissent, jus-
tice Black presented the issue with which the Swarb court was con-
fronted:
In effect the Court treats the provision as a waiver of the Szukhents'
constitutional right not to be compelled to go to a New York
court to defend themselves against the company's claims. This
printed form provision buried in a multitude of words is too weak
an imitation of a genuine agreement to be treated as a waiver of
so important a constitutional safeguard as is the right to be sued
at home. Waivers of constitutional rights to be effective, this Court
has said, must be deliberately and understandingly made and can
be established only by clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous lan-
guage. It strains credulity to suggest that these Michigan farmers
ever read this contractual provision about Mrs. Weinberg and
about "accepting service of any process within the State of New
York." And it exhausts credulity to think that they or any other lay-
men reading these legalistic words would have known or even sus-
pected that they amounted to an agreement of the Szukhents to
let the company sue them in New York should any controversy
arise. This Court should not permit valuable constitutional rights
to be destroyed by any such sharp contractual practices. The idea
79. Id. at 64.
80. It is fortunate that the court restricted its holding to the unknowing waiver of
notice, for if it had relied upon those heretofore unrecognized rights, which this court
recognized as substantive due process rights, it would be a very weak decision subject to
almost immediate reversal.
81. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
82. Id. at 315.
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that there was a knowing consent of the Szukhents to be sued in
the courts of New York is no more than a fiction-not even an
amiable one at that.83 (Emphasis added).
The opportunity to be heard means the opportunity to present a
defense.8 4 The opportunity to be heard is implicit in the notice re-
quirement of due process. Of what value is the opportunity to defend
if the defendant never receives notice of a suit pending against him?
And likewise, of what value is notice if the defendant is not able to
defend? Notice and opportunity to defend are not distinguishable one
from the other. A denial of one is tantamount to a denial of the
other.85 The Swarb case, therefore, stands for a much larger propo-
sition than it would appear at first glance. The Swarb case, in recogniz-
ing the unknowing waiver of notice, a fortiori recognized the unknowing
waiver of the opportunity to defend. s6
When a creditor, who qualifies as a holder in due course, or as an
assignee of a contract containing a waiver of defenses clause, files suit
against a defendant-consumer, the defendant-consumer is served with
notice. He can make pleadings, file motions, and otherwise attack the
plaintiff-creditor's case, but under U.C.C. § 3-305 and § 9-206, he
cannot assert a defense if the only defenses available are "personal."
In signing the contract authorizing assignment, the consumer has, in
effect, waived his personal defenses against the transferee or assignee.
The opportunity to be heard contains several essential elements, the
denial of any one of which is unconstitutional as violative of due
process.87 If a court were to arbitrarily refuse to allow a defendant to
assert what may constitute a valid defense, without question, it would
be a violation of the opportunity to defend requirement of due
process. There is no doubt but that a defendant may waive his con-
stitutional rights,8 8 but unless that waiver is knowingly made, it is
83. Id. at 332.
84. Ray v. Norseworthy, 90 U.S. 116 (1874) where the court, at 118, said: "No man is
to have his property taken from him by a judicial sentence without the privilege
of showing, if he can, that the pretext for doing it is unfounded."
85. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876) where the court reversed a trial court's
refusal to allow a defendant in a civil action to enter a personal appearance. The court
stated that the notice requirement is a nullity if the defendant is not afforded the
opportunity to be heard.
86. This is further evidenced by the Swarb court's refusal to give any validity to the
right of a judgment-debtor to petition the court to open judgment in order to allow a
presentation of a meritorious defense. See note 34.
87. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where a defendant was not permitted to
have the assistance of counsel in his defense, thereby depriving him of the opportunity
to defend in violation of the due process clause.
88. See EHRENZWIEG, GOODRICH, LEFLAR, supra note 23.
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ineffective.8s Granted this waiver is not effective until the note is
assigned, but neither was the waiver of notice effective in the Swarb
case until the note was confessed.
A state may validly legislate to create or abolish defenses,90 and it
may be argued that this is the effect of U.C.C. § 3-305 and § 9-206,
merely a state regulation of defenses. This approach, however, ignores
the issue which is presented. The problem encountered here concerns
itself with the unknowing waiver of existing defenses. The consumer
should be given the opportunity to make an intelligent and knowing
choice: either sign a contract and waive his personal defenses against
a subsequent transferee or assignee, or sign a contract which is non-
negotiable or contains no waiver clause and retain all his defenses.91
It is submitted that the current practice of allowing a consumer to
unknowingly waive his right to raise personal defenses is violative of
due process and therefore unconstitutional. This does not mean that
the protected status of holders in due course or assignees of contracts
containing waiver of defense clauses is to be forever destroyed. On the
contrary, it may be strengthened with little additional burden upon
the finance companies. The ideal solution should insure the knowing
waiver of the consumer, yet retain the protected status of transferees
and assignees. This result can be achieved very easily. Section 3-307 of
the U.C.C. deals with the burden of proof in establishing defenses and
due course.92 Paragraph (2) states that after the authenticity of the
instrument is established, the defendant can raise his defenses.93 Once
a personal defense is raised, the plaintiff-creditor, under paragraph (3),
89. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.s. 1 (1966).
90. Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33, 99 A. 215 (1916) which held that
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 41 (1952), Pennsylvania's Workmen's Compensation Act, which
abolished the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk and the
fellow servant rule, did not violate deprivation of property without due process of law.
91. This perhaps ignores the realities and assumes that the seller will bargain in
such a manner. But even where the consumer has the choice of signing a negotiable
instrument or "no deal," when he knowingly chooses, procedural due process is met.
92. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 version) § 3-307. Burden of Establishing Signa-
tures, Defenses and Due Course:
(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings each signature on an instrument is
admitted. When the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue
(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming under the signature; but
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized except where the action
is to enforce the obligation or a purported signer who has died or become in-
competent before proof is required.
(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument en-
titles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense.
(3) After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the rights of a holder in
due course has the burden of establishing that he or some person under whom he
claims is in all respects a holder in due course.
93. Id. subsection (2).
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then has the burden of proving his protected status.9 4 If the plaintiff
meets his burden, the personal defenses are invalid as against him. The
solution to the problem is to impose an additional burden upon the
plaintiff-creditor-that of proving that the defendant-consumer know-
ingly waived his contitutional rights. This is what the Swarb court
required of its creditor-respondents. 95 In practice, the defense of an
unknowing waiver of personal defenses would always be available to
the defendant-consumer, and once raised, the burden of proving knowl-
edgeable waiver would rest upon the plaintiff-creditor.
This solution does not ignore realities. In practice, a finance company
deals with a steady clientele of sellers and retailers. Rarely is a nego-
tiable instrument assigned more than once, so the finance company
usually personally knows the orginal seller. Often, in order to acquire
the status of a holder in due course, finance companies will turn their
heads so as not to see obvious abuses by sellers. By imposing this addi-
tional burden upon finance companies, not only will they take note of
obvious abuses, but they will also take steps to insure that there is
always a knowing waiver on paper they buy. Indeed, if the financial
institutions wish to preserve their protected status, they will cooperate
or lose the status altogether.
CONCLUSION
The Swarb case and the various commentators offer ample evidence
that most consumers do not understand, nor are they afforded the
opportunity to learn, what they are signing. Despite its various short-
comings, the approach of the court in the Swarb case was refreshing
because it recognized the problem and alleviated it. By applying the
holdings of the Supreme Court that there is not a presumption that
a person acquiesces in the waiver of his constitutional rights, the Swarb
court held the confession of judgment practice to be violative of due
process.
The consumer is now protected from confessions of judgment, but
he is still left unprotected when it comes to negotiable instruments or
assignable contracts. "[The Supreme] Court should not permit valu-
able constitutional rights to be destroyed by such sharp contractual
94. Id. subsection (3).
95. The Swarb cases established a hearing for all those confessions of judgment already




practices." 96 This statement by Mr. Justice Black in National Equip-
ment Rental v. Szukhent9 7 recognizes the constitutional dimensions of
contracts. It should make no difference what form the contract takes;
be it an instrument that when negotiated to a holder in due course
waives the drawer's personal defenses, or be it a contract that when
assigned also waives such defenses. Likewise, it should make no differ-
ence what constitutional right is waived, if indeed any distinction can
be made between notice and opportunity to defend. All that is im-
portant is that the constitutional right be knowingly waived.
It is submitted that by following the approach suggested in this
comment, finance companies would earn their protected status by polic-
ing the practices of retailers. Failure to do this would result in the loss
of this protected status.
Most importantly, this approach would protect the consumer by
allowing him to make a knowing and intelligent choice. Is that not
what the Constitution is all abou?
JOHN C. REED
96. National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 333 (1964).
97. Id. taken from Justice Black's dissenting opinion.
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